Translated from the Hebrew Original
Members of Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS), former senior officials in Israel’s security and foreign-policy establishment, spent more than a year examining the implications of annexation measures for Israel’s security. We have identified serious risks on three levels: local, regional, and international.
In our professional judgment, some of these risks are already manifest, and there is a high probability — though not certainty — that the remaining risks will materialize as well. It is therefore essential to ensure that decisions regarding annexation are not implemented before two conditions are met:
- The government must confirm that it has considered these risks and identified reasonable responses to them.
- The risks to national security and to the personal security of every citizen must be presented to the Israeli public, which should determine whether it is prepared to pay the heavy price entailed by annexation measures.
The Security Risks to Israel and Its Citizens Posed by the Government’s Annexation Decisions
Local
The government’s measures threaten to bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and are already driving elements of the Palestinian population toward greater radicalization, arming themselves and organizing for violent activity. An escalation of these threats would require Israel to re-occupy the entire West Bank and its three million residents, prepare for the possibility of increasingly violent rounds of conflict and their spillover into Israel proper, and would further strain the IDF, whose forces are already stretched to the limit across multiple external fronts.
Security cooperation with the PA is vital to Israel’s security. The IDF and Shin Bet credit the PA’s security forces with preventing terrorist attacks and saving the lives of many Israelis.
The annexation measures — both government decisions and unauthorized initiatives — including the establishment of more than twenty outposts in Areas A and B, where all Israeli settlement is prohibited, in addition to more than 200 outposts established in Area C, combined with the economic strangulation imposed by the government and an unprecedented escalation in settler violence, threaten to bring about the collapse of the PA and the disintegration of its security forces. In the absence of an effective governing authority, and given the likelihood of a Hamas takeover, the collapse of the PA would require the IDF to reassert control over the entire West Bank and to administer — and finance — the lives of its three million Palestinians.
This process is already accelerating radicalization among the younger Palestinian generation, motivating it to acquire weapons, and organize for terrorist activity, either through local initiatives or by joining terrorist organizations, foremost among them Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
This chain of events could ignite a violent uprising in the West Bank, including the possible joining of PA security personnel and Fatah’s Tanzim, endangering the lives of Israeli settlers. The spillover into Jerusalem and Israel’s Arab community would severely challenge the already limited human and other resources of the Israel Police and Border Police.
Current partial annexation measures already place a significant additional burden on the IDF, requiring an increase in force deployments to protect Israeli settlers and the Green Line, as well as for dealing with the consequences of Palestinian radicalization. This comes at the expense of readiness for challenges from the north (Syria and Lebanon), the east (Iran), and the south (Gaza and Yemen), at a time when the IDF is already facing a severe manpower shortage.
In the absence of a functioning PA, amid violence on the ground and growing regional hostility (see below), the prospects for implementing President Trump’s initiative for Gaza will diminish. Israel could consequently be dragged into a renewed and bloody occupation of the Gaza Strip as well, and forced to administer — and finance — the lives of its two million residents, without an exit strategy.
Regional
The forceful reactions of regional states to the government’s policies and to the deterioration in the West Bank indicate that security cooperation with neighboring countries could be placed in serious jeopardy. The Abraham Accords could collapse, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia could be lost, as could Israel’s opportunity to join a regional coalition aimed at containing Iran and its proxies.
Jordan
Four times over the past two years, the strategic importance of the Kingdom of Jordan and security coordination with it has been demonstrated in the face of attacks originating from Iran. These instances are merely the tip of the iceberg of the less visible security benefits provided by the peace treaty with our neighboring kingdom, whose vast territory provides Israel with strategic depth, both in the air and on land, against hostile forces to the east and north.
While Israel has no substitute for the Hashemite Kingdom’s contribution to our security — including its impressive efforts to secure our longest border — government policy has already generated severe tensions, a rupture between the Royal Palace and the Prime Minister’s Office, and a cooling and downgrading of relations. Annexation measures, viewed by Jordan as a potential prelude to the expulsion of Palestinians into its territory, threaten to deepen this rift, potentially leading to a break in relations and the collapse of the security coordination infrastructure.
Egypt
In signing the peace treaty with the largest and most powerful Arab state, Prime Minister Menachem Begin secured a strategic contribution to Israel’s security of historic proportions. Egypt’s withdrawal from the circle of warfare not only enabled Israel to redirect resources from defense to other needs; not only has not a single Israeli fallen as a result of a decision by an Egyptian government since the treaty came into force; but over the decades, security coordination between the two countries against common enemies — including al-Qaeda, ISIS, and others — has developed to a level that even the treaty’s strongest advocates could not have anticipated. The full extent of its contribution to Israel’s security still cannot be made public.
Egypt’s importance to Israel’s security acquired an additional dimension following Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip, the successive rounds of fighting there, and the October 7 war. Despite its failures in past years to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza, Egypt — where Hamas’s parent organization is outlawed and persecuted — has emerged as the principal restraining force vis-à-vis Hamas and as a more effective mediator than others in every understanding and arrangement between Israel and Hamas. Today, Egypt is a central player in efforts to implement Phase Two of President Trump’s plan, including in compelling Hamas to agree to a disarmament process, as well as in any alternative scenario should that effort materialize.
Israel’s policies toward Gaza as well as the West Bank, together with statements by our leaders concerning their intentions to expel Palestinians and annex territory, have already generated diplomatic tensions, cooled relations, and produced a prolonged rupture between the Prime Minister and the Egyptian President. Annexation in the West Bank is interpreted in Egypt as a prelude to a similar move in Gaza, alongside the threat of expelling two million Gazans into Egyptian territory — a threat repeatedly voiced by government and Knesset members as well as reflected in a plan advanced by the Minister for Strategic Affairs. Government decisions and conduct on the ground lend this threat a practical dimension. They could therefore prove to be a course of action that brings about the collapse of relations, the loss of vital security-coordination assets, and a process in which Egypt accelerates its alignment with strategic alternatives hostile to Israel.
The Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia and a Regional Coalition
The October 7 war produced a significant retreat in the intimacy of Israel’s relations with the countries of the Abraham Accords. The attack in Doha alarmed all the Gulf states and further diminished the perception of Israel as a worthy ally. Their sharp criticism, together with that of Saudi Arabia and others, of government decisions concerning annexation and attitude to settler violence has reinforced their concern that the current Israeli government is unrestrained and dangerous to regional stability. As a result, the prospects for normalization with Saudi Arabia and with a range of Arab and Muslim states awaiting its decision are steadily diminishing.
Consequently, Israel is increasingly losing the opportunity to become part of a strategic regional coalition that would work to contain Iran and its proxies while advancing the welfare of all its members. As Israel is being sidelined, the region’s leading actors are organizing without us, if not against us — as demonstrated by the defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and the trilateral agreement among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey.
The International Dimension
President Trump’s annoyance at the obstruction of his regional policy, growing European criticism of the government’s policies, and the need of other friendly countries to respond to public opinion in their own societies have already produced a shift from critical statements to hostile measures. Together, these developments create the foundations for a diplomatic tsunami with potentially devastating security and economic consequences.
The United States
President Trump has demonstrated repeatedly his willingness to act contrary to the position of the Israeli government, including on issues important to our own security. This was evident when he initiated a ceasefire with the Houthis behind our government’s back; when he imposed ceasefires in Gaza (twice), Lebanon (twice), and Iran (twice); when he compelled the Prime Minister to apologize to the Emir of Qatar for the attack on senior Hamas figures in his capital; and when he imposed both his 20-point initiative and negotiations with the Lebanese government.
The fact that President Trump initiated and secured the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which disregarded Israeli objections, signaled the possibility that, unlike his predecessors, he may not prevent — and may even initiate — sanctions against Israel.
The fact that CIS welcomed some of the President’s initiatives, certainly those that led to ceasefires and the return of our hostages, in no way diminishes the gravity of this development.
In light of the dramatic erosion of support for Israel among American public opinion, particularly among younger generations in both political parties, and the growing criticism of government policies in Congress, Israel has lost a vital source of protection: the goodwill of American public opinion and the traditional bipartisan support for Israel in Congress, both of which have historically served to restrain potentially unfavorable intentions by a sitting president.
Moreover, the current American administration has recently expressed, both verbally and through concrete measures, the seriousness with which it views the Israeli Government’s conduct in the West Bank. While the U.S. ambassador has repeatedly called on the government to restrain settler violence, which he has described as “terrorism,” reports increase of American pressure to evacuate outposts and farms used to seize large areas of Palestinian land and from which perpetrators of violence operate.
Our government must therefore carefully consider the implications of conduct that is undermining the unwritten foundations of the strategic alliance with the United States — a cornerstone of Israel’s national-security.
Europe and Beyond
The diplomatic tsunami that has already reached our shores is gathering further momentum as it becomes increasingly clear that the Israeli government is indeed pursuing annexation of the West Bank. European and other countries have already moved from expressions of criticism to concrete measures. Some are imposing sanctions on Israel — including in the area of security relations, against the settlement enterprise, and against Israeli citizens associated with it. These and other countries, as well as the European Union, are considering additional measures.
The government’s conduct in the West Bank — both annexation and its lenient – if not complicit – attitude toward settler violence — is fueling the campaign to delegitimize Israel’s very existence, providing grounds for accusations that Israel is an apartheid state. Even friendly leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore trends in public opinion in their own countries.
World Jewry
The clear majority opposition among Jews in the Diaspora to government policy regarding the Palestinians, particularly the drive toward annexation, is accelerating the distancing from Israel, especially among younger generations. It threatens the historic partnership in the Zionist enterprise between Israel and our brothers and sisters overseas, and erodes an important pillar in efforts to counter policies hostile to Israel.
The moral implications, together with the global response to annexation measures and to the government’s attitude toward settler violence, are confronting Diaspora Jews for the first time with the dilemma of identifying with an Israel that no longer reflects their values. This includes the question of whether it is possible — and whether it is desirable — to identify with and defend an Israel drifting toward becoming a pariah state because of its conduct in The Territories.
The erosion of the foundations of this vital partnership constitutes a devastating blow to the essence of Zionism and to Israel’s character as a joint enterprise of the Jewish people wherever they live. It also erodes the willingness and ability of Diaspora Jewry to influence their governments regarding their attitudes toward Israel and their policies in relation to it.
A Final Note: It Is Still Reversible
The anticipated damage to multiple dimensions of national security, and their cumulative destructive impact, are not the result of some Force Majeure. They are the consequences of government actions. The government has both the ability and the authority to change course. It has a duty to do so.
Against this background comes our urgent call on the government to adopt policies that will prevent the collapse of Israel’s diplomatic and security standing. The government should:
- Cancel annexation decisions and abandoning other annexation initiatives.
- Curb settler violence and the terrorizing of Palestinians.
- Reverse the approach toward the PA (for all its shortcomings), from viewing it as an enemy to treating it as a partner.
- Assist the Trump administration and the Board of Peace in stabilizing and demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, while ensuring an alternative governing authority to Hamas and its disarmament.
- Reverse the slide toward a destructive and bloody one-state reality, in favor of civil separation between the two peoples, while maintaining security control throughout the territory until robust alternative security arrangements are established as part of an agreement.
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For a summary of the CIS study on the implications of annexation:
https://en.cis.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/RAMIFICATIONS-OF-WEST-BANK-ANNEXATION.pdf
