Enhancing West Bank Stability and Security

Reducing Friction between Israelis and Palestinians

Improving Palestinian Authority Governance

June 2017
Background

- A permanent status agreement (PSA) between Israel and the Palestinians based on the ‘two states for two peoples’ principle requires separating the Israeli and Palestinian populations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

- Over a year ago, given the uncertain prospects for a PSA, Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) unveiled its Security First plan.¹ The plan called upon the Israeli government to take independent security, political, economic and civil initiatives to bolster security and improve the overall situation until a PSA is reached. CIS was convinced then, and is convinced now, that implementing this plan carries the promise of substantial and immediate contribution to Israel’s security.

- In light of the Trump administration’s stated commitment to resolving the conflict, and in order create more favorable conditions for negotiations, CIS has updated its plan. The new approach shifts the focus from exclusively unilateral steps aimed at improving security and stability with an eye towards a future agreement, to structuring a web of mutual steps aimed at improving the overall situation.

- While the Security First plan is still relevant as an independent Israeli course of action, it is also a vital component in the process of restarting negotiations towards a PSA.

- The plan presented below is a companion proposal to the paper entitled Regulating Israeli and Palestinian Construction in Area C (May 2017).² Both documents elaborate and expand on the recommendations of the CIS comprehensive Security First plan.

- Reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians, strengthening governance in the Palestinian Authority (PA), bringing law and order to Palestinian areas where it does not currently exist, and sustaining motivation for close coordination with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the part of Palestinian security forces – all serve Israel’s security interests. It is these interests that the current plan seeks to promote.

- Neither the Security First plan nor its two derivatives purport to offer a framework for a PSA. They are, rather, an array of provisional measures designed to maintain stability and security until a PSA is reached. They, therefore, call for far reaching steps to stabilize the situation in the interim period – whatever its duration – without at this stage altering IDF deployment in the West Bank or withdrawing Jewish settlements.

Goals

- Enhancing personal security for Israelis and Palestinians.
- Strengthening PA governance.
- Ensuring continued security coordination between Israel and the PA and preserving the motivation of Palestinian security forces to work closely with the IDF.
- Improving the Palestinian economy.
- Building confidence between the two sides.
- Preserving conditions for a PSA.

Method

- Partial and phased separation between Israelis and Palestinians.
- Transfer to the PA governing responsibility and authority for certain areas, over which Israel has not laid claim during the course of negotiations.
- Extending the authority of Palestinian security forces in order to establish law and order in areas where it is not currently enforced.
- Increasing coordination between Palestinian and Israeli security forces.
- Enhancing territorial contiguity for Palestinian vehicular traffic, especially of the Palestinian Police.
- Improving conditions for Palestinian economic development.
- Encouraging the PA to take confidence building measures and improve bilateral relations in response to the proposed Israeli initiative.
- Encouraging the US government to assist in planning and coordinating these mutual actions.

Facts and Figures

- The total area of the West Bank is 5,842 sq. km. (including East Jerusalem and half of ’no man’s land’).
- At the end of 2016, roughly 420,000 Israelis and 2.3 million Palestinians lived in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem (see Table 2).
- Under the 1995 Interim Agreement, some 60% of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) are defined as Area C, and are under full Israeli control. The remaining 40% are classified as areas A and B and are under the jurisdiction of the PA.
- Areas A and B, where 90% of the Palestinians live, consist of 169 non-contiguous ‘islands’ (cities or villages) surrounded by Area C (see Map 1).
- Area C contains 126 Israeli settlements (including the Council of the Jewish Community of Hebron). Of these, 4 are cities, 13 are towns (local councils) and 109 are rural settlements contained in six regional councils.
The 1995 Interim Agreement states that Area A and B would encompass 40% of the West Bank, and Area C - 60%. However, this proportion was not strictly followed in the actual territory division.
Elements of the Plan
Expanding Area B:

- Transportation between the 169 ‘islands’ constituting areas A and B must run through Area C (which is under Israeli control). This raises obstacles to Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank, including for the purpose of law enforcement, undermining the ability of the PA to govern.

- Both sides have an interest in strengthening PA control over the population and areas under its jurisdiction. To achieve this, a measure of Palestinian territorial contiguity must be established. Specific and limited sections of Area C, particularly in the space between the ‘islands’, should be reassigned to Area B, and thus to Palestinian control.

- Any and all changes will be subject to a number of security considerations. Territories will only be reassigned if:
  - Transferring them will not create friction between the Israeli and Palestinian populations;
  - Transferring will not detract from security or freedom of movement for Israelis, and;
  - They are located at least 500 meters from the outer perimeter of the nearest Jewish settlement or from the Security Fence.

- The authority to re-designate segments of Area C as B and/or to transfer to the PA specific authorities (i.e. over planning and zoning) is vested with the military commander in the person of the IDF Commander of the Central Command. However, given the political sensitivity of the matter, it is expected that such a decision will require the approval of either the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs (the Political–Security Cabinet) or even of the Cabinet Plenary. In any event, it requires no legislation nor otherwise approval by the Knesset or any of its organs.

- Subject to the aforementioned security considerations, a cumulative total of 617 sq. km. of land adjacent to areas A and B, representing some 10.5% of the West Bank, can be transferred to Palestinian control (see Map 4). In this scenario, 74 Palestinian ‘islands’ would remain (as opposed to the present 169).

- The territory would be transferred in three phases (see Table 1 and maps 2 through 4). The implementation of each sequential phase would depend on the conduct of the PA, the degree to which it asserts its authority, the level of cooperation it affords Israel, and the reactions of the Palestinians residing in the areas in question (see pages 16 and 18 below).
Table 1: Phases in the transfer of territories from Area C to Area B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Size of area to be transferred</th>
<th>Cumulative area transferred</th>
<th>No. of &quot;islands&quot; remaining at the end of each phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>North of Road 5</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Between Roads 1 and 5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>South of Road 1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP 2: Phase 1 – 6.6%

Legend
- The Green Line
- Existing ‘Security Fence’
- Planned ‘Security Fence’
- Proposed ‘Security Fence’
- Jerusalem Muni. Border
- Israeli Settlement
- Palestinian City or Village

Division of Jurisdiction in the West Bank
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- First Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division in sq. km.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area A</td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area B</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Area B</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,588</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

West Bank Total Area - 5,842 sq. km.

Area Annexed To Israel as Part of the Final Agreement - 242 sq. km, 4.14% of the West Bank

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MAP 3: Phase 2 – 2.3% (for a total of 8.9%)

Legend
- The Green Line
- Existing ‘Security Fence’
- Planned ‘Security Fence’
- Proposed ‘Security Fence’
- Jerusalem Mun. Border
- Israeli Settlement
- Palestinian City or Village

Division of Jurisdiction in the West Bank
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- First Phase
- Second Phase

Division in sq. km.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area A</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area B</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Area B</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,722</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Bank Total Area - 5,842 sq. km.

Area Annexed To Israel as Part of the Final Agreement - 242 sq. km, 4.14% of the West Bank

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MAP 4: Phase 3 – 1.6% (for a total of 10.5%)

Legend
- Green Line
- Existing 'Security Fence'
- Planned 'Security Fence'
- Proposed 'Security Fence'
- Jerusalem Mun. Border
- Israeli Settlement
- Palestinian City or Village

Division of Jurisdiction in the West Bank
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- First Phase
- Second Phase
- Third Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Area A</th>
<th>Area B</th>
<th>Additional Area B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in sq. km</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>2,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Bank Total Area - 5,842 sq. km.

Area Annexed To Israel as Part of the Final Agreement - 242 sq. km, 4.14% of the West Bank

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Enabling Unhindered Flow of Palestinian Traffic

Note: Since the prerequisites for implementing the measures detailed below are time consuming and resource intensive, establishing Palestinian territorial contiguity (above) should not be contingent on first bringing about the unhindered flow of Palestinian traffic (below).

- The creation of a transportation network that facilitates rapid movement between Palestinian population centers in the West Bank, as well as easy access to Israel and international crossings for Palestinian industry, will impact PA governance. It will enable the enforcement of law and order in distant locations, hitherto isolated from police stations; reduce friction between Palestinians and Israelis; boost the Palestinian economy; and improve the overall atmosphere. Altogether, these changes will serve to promote stability and enhance the security of settlers and the Israeli population in general.

- In those areas where it is not possible to establish Palestinian territorial contiguity, transport corridors will be set up to facilitate the free flow of Palestinian traffic between areas A and B. Where Palestinian traffic passes through roads in Area C (which serve Israeli traffic as well), corridors will be established to allow for the unhindered flow of Palestinian traffic (see Map 5). Some of these corridors already exist, while others must be built.

- A security annex will be drawn up to guide efforts to achieve uninterrupted Palestinian traffic in a manner that addresses the security needs of Israeli traffic, and reduces prospects of terror attacks along roads which serve both Palestinian and Israeli vehicles.
Preference will be given to the construction of Palestinian transportation solutions on two main roads:

- The Bethlehem–Hebron road on the section of Route 60 that crosses Gush Etzion. This, the most complicated of all transport solutions required, is needed to connect East Jerusalem with Bethlehem and Hebron to the south. Today, Israelis and Palestinians jointly use the section of Route 60 that crosses Gush Etzion (from the Efrat–North junction southwards). The construction of a Gush Etzion bypass from the east will not be sufficient to connect East Jerusalem with Bethlehem and Hebron. An optimal solution would be to build a separate road for Palestinian use by means of the 'cut and cover' method (the road is paved lower than ground level and covered with a concrete and sand 'roof'), including a tunnel under the Gush Etzion junction. This would serve to completely separate Israeli and Palestinian traffic, and prevent friction at the Gush Etzion junction which has been the site of frequent terror attacks (see map 6).
The Maale Adumim–Jerusalem road on Route 1 East that cuts Palestinian contiguity from north to south. The tunnel for Palestinian traffic from Hizma to Az-Za’ayem and southwards to Al-Eizariya must be completed.

MAP 7: Transportation Solutions East of Jerusalem
Extending the Authority of Palestinian Security Forces

- The proposed transfer of authority will allow Palestinian security forces – first and foremost the Palestinian Police – to operate freely in areas A and B, including territories transferred to Area B status under this plan, so that they can reach any village without prior coordination with the IDF. This will enable them to enforce law and order in places that do not currently enjoy regular police services. As of today, roughly 580,000 Palestinians out of the 900,000 residing in Area B (some 64%) lack access to law enforcement. The plan would give the entire population of Area B access to PA law enforcement.

- Local transport arrangements will be determined jointly by IDF regional brigade commanders and their Palestinian counterparts based on the specific conditions prevailing in each location.

Table 2: Palestinians Lacking Police Services
(Population figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Governorate</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Population lacking regular police services*</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>318,961</td>
<td>59,249</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>389,326</td>
<td>43,517</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubas</td>
<td>68,853</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>185,314</td>
<td>27,302</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqiliya</td>
<td>113,567</td>
<td>47,998</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>357,968</td>
<td>162,342</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salfit</td>
<td>72,278</td>
<td>41,079</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem**</td>
<td>161,596</td>
<td>95,552</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>53,561</td>
<td>9,431</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>221,803</td>
<td>49,607</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>729,037</td>
<td>34,208</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,670,264</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>576,150</strong></td>
<td><strong>22%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures include Palestinians living in Area C and residents of villages in Area B that lack a police station.

** Figures relate to Palestinian residents of the PA’s designated ‘Jerusalem Governorate’ but not included in the Israeli municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Consequently, figures exclude Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem living under Israeli sovereignty.

*** This figure, taken from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, is also used by Israel’s security forces; However, Prof. Sergio de la Pergola, a leading demographer estimates the number of Palestinians in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, to be in the order of 2.3 million.
In each area where authority is not transferred to the PA, a unique operational model should be adopted, tailored to Israel’s security needs. In some places Palestinian security forces will operate without coordinating with the IDF; in some locations Palestinian security forces will be required to inform the IDF that they plan to set out on a mission but will not have to wait for approval; in yet others they will require permission of the IDF (see Map 8 – the Tulkarm model).

The new situation will strengthen the ability of the PA to govern by providing regular police services. The number of Palestinians benefiting from law enforcement will grow by the following increments:

- Phase 1: 153,038 people.
- Phase 2: 199,932 people.
- Phase 3: 156,140 people.

All told, 509,110 people (some 88% of Palestinians who do not currently receive police services) will benefit from law enforcement, something that will improve security for Palestinians and carry a positive impact on the security of Israelis as well.

Implementing this arrangement will eliminate many of the complications deriving from the need to coordinate with the IDF police actions in small, densely populated areas.

Expanding and Training Palestinian Security Forces

Israel will initiate a coordinated effort, together with international parties, to enhance the capabilities of Palestinian policing, legal and penal institutions as part of a five-year plan.

The plan will train law enforcement services to deal effectively with their new obligations, as expanded by the current proposal, with an emphasis on counterterrorism capabilities. This will involve a major expansion of the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Palestinian Police, upgrading their capacity (by training personnel, developing and embedding operational doctrine, establishing command and control systems, etc.), and improving the Palestinian court and prison systems.

Donor nations will be asked to earmark funds for this purpose, and professional assistance will be sought from the American and European bodies responsible for training Palestinian security forces, the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS).
Concurrent Palestinian Measures

- Taken together, the recommendations in this report are intended to serve Israel’s security interests, both directly and indirectly. They should therefore be implemented unconditionally, except in cases where Israeli security needs require otherwise.

- For this reason, progress between successive phases of the plan for Palestinian territorial contiguity will proceed subject to the conduct of the PA and its proven ability to exercise its expanded authority. This will be measured, first and foremost, by the degree to which the PA succeeds in enforcing law and order and combating terrorist activities.

- Beyond that, Israel and other parties interested in promoting stability (e.g. the US and the Arab Quartet) should insist that the PA responds to the Israeli initiative with measures of its own to upgrade security, improve the overall atmosphere and promote dialogue. Examples include:
  - Increasing coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, inter alia by establishing joint operations centers to combat terror and by upgrading mechanisms for intelligence sharing and coordination of field operations.
  - A relentless struggle against terrorist elements, including increased detection and prevention of the illegal manufacture and sale of weapons.
  - An end to the glorification of terrorists and acts of terror by naming public institutions in their honor, and termination of the policy of paying benefits to relatives of terrorists, both living and dead.
  - A Palestinian commitment not to appeal to the UN or other international bodies with the goal of imposing a diplomatic solution or launching criminal proceedings against Israelis.
  - Stopping incitement against Israel in Palestinian communications media – official ones in particular – and convening the Tripartite Commission (including the US) for this purpose.
  - Legislation to enhance anti-terrorism efforts.
  - Formulation of a master plan for vital infrastructure in fields such as transportation, energy, water and the environment, the lack of which has given rise to areas devoid of planning and governance and which has encouraged illegal construction.
  - Promoting joint civil society activities between Palestinians and Israelis, such as cultural and sporting events.

- As part of the effort to renew negotiations, we recommend that the US administration, together with the relevant parties, draft a phased, interrelated plan [a ‘Zipper’] for implementing this proposal concurrent with the implementation of the CIS plans Regulating Israeli and Palestinian Construction in Area C (May 2017) and Security First (June 2016).
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'Commanders for Israel’s Security' (CIS) is a non-partisan Movement. Its members are retired Generals and equivalents in Israel’s security services (the IDF, Israeli Security Agency, Mossad and Israel Police). Its members seek to promote no personal ambition. They are motivated solely by concern for the future of our country, our children and grandchildren.

The CIS took a decision to promote a security-political initiative that will extricate Israel from the current impasse as an interim step toward implementing its Vision.

The Movement’s Vision is centered around the need to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinians; to normalize relations and enter into security arrangements with pragmatic Arab states; and thus to secure Israel within final, recognized boundaries while ensuring its identity as the democratic state of the Jewish People.